

China's New Military Elite

*Li Cheng & Scott W. Harold**

Beginning of a New Era

Analyses of the 17th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have largely focused on the policy and personnel changes taken at the leadership conference.¹ Much less has been said about the implications of the massive turnover among the military representatives who sit on the Party's 17th Central Committee (CC), including its powerful Central Military Commission (CMC). While generational turnover is leading to a new Chinese political leadership that is less technocratic and more broadly trained in economic and legal fields, the Chinese military elites on the Party's top bodies are becoming ever more functionally-specialized in their areas of military expertise. Meanwhile, various forms of patron-client ties and political networks have played crucial roles in the

Li Cheng is a senior fellow at the John L. Thornton China Center of the Brookings Institution and William R. Kenan Professor of Government at Hamilton College. Scott W. Harold is a research analyst at the John L. Thornton China Center of the Brookings Institution and an adjunct assistant professor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.

China Security, Vol. 3 No. 4 Autumn 2007, pp. 62 - 89
2007 World Security Institute

rapid rise of young and technocratic officers.

These new, and sometimes contrasting, developments are important as one seeks to assess the future of civil-military relations in China and the challenges that the CCP will face in managing its military modernization efforts. What factors contributed to the large turnover among the military leadership at the Party Congress? What are the group characteristics of these rising stars in the Chinese military? What can an analysis of the professional backgrounds and political networks of China's top officers reveal about the dynamics between civilian and military elites? What does an analysis of who's up and who's down tell us about where China's military modernization efforts are heading? At this time, only preliminary answers to these questions can be sketched out by examining the characteristics of the 65 full and alternate members of the 17th CC who represent the People's Liberation Army (PLA).

The Chinese military is in the midst of a major transformation in order to prepare for what the top leaders call the "new era of information warfare." The most remarkable reflection of this transformation, which will very likely accelerate under the new civilian and military leadership in the coming years, is the trend towards ever-greater technocratic leadership among the PLA. China's military elites in the post-17th Party Congress environment are among the best-educated and most well-trained specialists ever to lead Chinese forces. A careful analysis of the profiles of the new Chinese military leadership can give insight into how China envisions transforming the forces of today to prevent, or if necessary, fight the wars of tomorrow and what advantages and shortcomings China's top officers may embody.

The study of Chinese military elites represents an essential starting point for any assessment of civil-military relations in China. As today's Chinese civilian leadership has increasingly focused its attention on issues of economic development and socio-political stability, little headway has been made in the task of building up civilian competency in military affairs. In theory, the CMC reports to the Politburo and its Standing Committee. Since 1992, only Presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao have served on the CMC, and they have held the posts

of chairman and first vice-chairman of the body largely to symbolize the Party's control over the gun. Paradoxically, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin both sought to avoid turning over the CMC chairmanship to a relatively untested successor by holding on to the seat even after they had stepped down from their political posts. As a result of the transition strategies adopted by previous Chinese top

Little headway has been made in building up civilian competency in military affairs.

leaders, the CMC itself has grown in importance, though without any increase in participation from civilian leaders other than the top Party leader. Sometime in the future, this could conceivably lead to practical challenges in exerting civilian control over the military, a long-standing goal of the CCP. This would especially be the case if the next generation of Chinese political elites come to be perceived as too ignorant about modern warfare to effectively manage the PLA.

At present, civilian control over the Chinese military rests on the shoulders of CCP General-Secretary Hu Jintao through his position as chairman of the CMC. Apart from Hu, no other civilians sit on the CMC, the ultimate decision-making body for Chinese military affairs. In addition, with the exception of Xi Jinping who had previously served as a *mishu* (personal secretary) to former Minister of Defense Geng Biao from 1979 to 1982, few other top contenders from among the fifth generation of CCP political elites have any links to or expertise in military affairs. Hu Jintao will likely appoint one or more figures from the fifth generation to the CMC, most likely to the post of vice-chair, sometime before the next normal rotation of CMC posts in 2012. Moreover, like Jiang Zemin before him, Hu may seek to retain the CMC chairmanship even after he steps down from his posts as president and party general-secretary. This will further enhance, intentionally or unintentionally, the power of the CMC leadership.

At the same time, such rules-bending maneuvers by the CMC chair are likely to grow increasingly difficult over time, as institutional norms take on greater prominence with the decline of charismatic/revolutionary authority such as that possessed by Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping. Recently, norms such as mandatory retirement ages and term limits have become more and more relevant in regulating

the civilian leadership's control over the military. It should be noted, however, while meritocratic criteria and standardized procedures carry much more weight in selecting top officers than ever before, informal networks such as blood ties, patron-client bonds, school connections, group army affiliations and regionally-based associations remain extremely important in accounting for the formation of the new military leadership. The characteristics of the new generation of Chinese military leaders – their professional competence and political associations – deserve careful scholarly analysis.

Large-Scale Turnover at the 17th Congress

The overall configuration of the military elites on the 17th CC was in many ways similar to that of the 16th CC. Eighteen percent (65 representatives) of the 371 members of the 17th CC come from military backgrounds, compared with 19 percent (67 representatives) of the 356 members of the 16th CC. Two military leaders, Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, serve on the 25-member Politburo on the 17th CC, the same number that sat on the Politburo of the 16th CC. The 17th Party Congress also brought four newcomers to the CMC: Chief of General Staff Chen Bingde, Director of the General Armaments Department Chang Wanquan, Commander of the Navy Wu Shengli and Commander of the Air Force Xu Qiliang.

The main difference between the 17th CC and previous CCs, however, is that no military elite serves on the current Secretariat (the leading Party body that handles daily administrative matters), whereas Gen. Zhang Wannian and Gen. Xu Caihou served on the Secretariat in the 15th and 16th CC's, respectively. The Secretariat, which is responsible for handling the Party's daily roster of events, is an important post that can provide leverage and influence over a broad array of issues. The absence of any military officials on the Secretariat therefore signals the further retreat of the PLA to a narrow focus on military affairs.

Although the overall representation of the military did not change much at the 17th CC, the rate of turnover of individual officers at the recent Party Congress was high. Generally speaking, the turnover rate of the CC as a whole has been

remarkably high over the past 25 years – newcomers constituted 60 percent of the 12th CC in 1982, held relatively stable, and made up 61 percent of the 16th CC in 2002.² Similarly, the military leadership has also experienced a high level of turnover as well. At the 16th CC, for example, approximately 60 percent of the PLA representatives were first-timers and all four directors of the PLA general departments were new.³ The turnover rate of the military leaders at the 17th Party Congress, however, was even higher than the previous CCs.

Among the 65 full and alternate PLA representatives on the 17th CC, an astonishing 66 percent are new arrivals. This is a higher ratio of turnover than that of the civilian elite on the new CC, only 63 percent of whom were first-timers.

**% of New Members from
Military in 17th CC**

CC Status	No. Individuals	No. First Timers	%
Full	41	24	59
Alternate	24	19	79
Total	65	43	66

This reflects a generational turnover, particularly among the alternates, most of whom are 5-10 years younger than their full-member colleagues. These younger officers are being tested as prospective leaders of the next generation

of military elites. Among the new full members, only two – Deputy Secretary of the Central Discipline Inspection Committee Sun Zhongtong and Commander of the Jinan Military Region (MR) Fan Changlong – were promoted from alternate status on the previous CC.

Several factors may have contributed to the large-scale turnover of military elites. First, China's top political leaders understandably do not want to risk creating any charismatic military heavyweights who might be capable of building up their own power bases within the country, and may therefore shift leaders regularly in order to prevent such a powerful figure from emerging within the military leadership. At the same time, the turnover may also reflect Hu Jintao's continuing effort to undermine any remaining influence of Jiang Zemin within the military so as to ensure that the PLA marches to the beat that the Hu-Wen leadership is playing.

CC Military Elites (Yr of Appt to Current Post)

Appt Year	2007	2006	2005	2004	2003	2002	2001	2000	1999	not known	Total
No.	25	5	9	7	7	8	1	1	1	1	65

One of the notable characteristics of the 65 PLA representatives on the 17th CC is that an overwhelming majority of them (94 percent) were appointed to their current posts since 2002, when Hu Jintao took over as general-secretary of the CCP. Since former Party General-Secretary Jiang Zemin hung around in his position as chairman of the CMC until 2004, one can reasonably assume that it was Jiang rather than Hu that made many of the military promotions that took place between 2002 and 2004. Even in light of this consideration, however, a full 60 percent of the current PLA representatives on the 17th CC were appointed between 2005 and 2007. This group includes a large number of the most important military leaders in the PLA.

All but two of the 37 most important military leaders – including members from the CMC, top leaders in the four general departments, the four services and three top military academic institutions – serve on the 17th CC (see Appendix 1). This reflects an intention to distribute these posts across the various organs and branches of military leadership as evenly as possible. Of the 37 military appointments, 60 percent were promoted to their current military posts since 2005 and 43 percent were promoted in 2007. All 14 of the commanders and commissars of China’s seven military regions have been made full members on the 17th CC and 12 of them are new appointees to the CC.⁴ Among these top 14 figures with operational control over the functional units that comprise the Chinese military, it is notable that 11 had previously held high-ranking positions in an MR, and six of those previously worked in a different MR than the one they currently serve in. These trends reflect Beijing’s concern with preventing the emergence of regionally-based military factionalism.

Of the 35 top military officers serving on the 17th CC, 21 are first-timers on the CC (including CMC member Wu Shengli), and 20 of them received promotions in military rank since 2005. In particular, among the 19 officers with the rank of

general/admiral, 10 were granted this highest military rank by Hu Jintao after he succeeded Jiang Zemin as the chairman of the CMC in September 2004. None of these military leaders have served in their current positions for more than two terms.⁵

Part of the reason for the large turnover in PLA leadership is related to growing norms related to mandatory retirement ages for military leaders. As a result of an emerging consensus among the top leadership of the CCP, no leader, civilian nor military, who was born before 1940 could serve on the CC elected at the 17th Party Congress. This explains the retirement of former CMC member and Cmdr. of the Air Force Qiao Qingchen, who was born in 1939. Some former top military officers who were born after 1940 also retired, thereby vacating even more seats for newcomers.⁶

Since the late 1990s, the Chinese military authorities have effectively implemented a well-defined regulation of age-based retirement.⁷ There is a specific age limit for the retirement of military officers at various levels, with the exception of the leaders of the four PLA general departments and the CMC.⁸ Age limits in the Chinese system are clearly linked to military rank. In 2000, the Standing Committee of the National Peoples' Congress (NPC) passed *The Law Governing Officers in Military Service*, which stipulates that all officers at the level of division command without the rank of major general or above should be demobilized from military service when they reach the age of 50, and all officers at the level of

regimental commander should be demobilized from military service when they reach the age of 45.⁹

Age Limit for Demob. or Retirement by Level of Mil. Leadership¹⁰

Level of Mil. Leadership	Age Limit
Platoon	30
Company	35
Battalion	40
Regiment	45
Division	50
Army	55
Military Region (Deputy)	60

The regulation of age-based retirement for military officers has led to two important outcomes. First, the average age of PLA officers has been dropping in recent years. The

average age of the State CMC, for example, declined by five years, from 68 in 1998 to 63 in 2003. The average age of the 17th CMC has remained 63. Two officers in their 50s, Chang Wanquan and Xu Qiliang, serve on the powerful CMC. None of the current full commanders or full commissars in the MRs is older than 65. Second, Chinese military elites at the same level of leadership are usually of similar ages. Among the 37 top officers, the total age distribution spans 11 years, with the oldest being 67 and the youngest a mere 56.

It should be noted that a significant number of the newly-appointed top military leaders obtained their current positions through a “two-step jump” (*liangji tiao*) instead of step-by-step promotion. For example, Beijing MR Cmdr. Fang Fenghui, Lanzhou MR Cmdr. Wang Guosheng, and Nanjing MR Cmdr. Zhao Keshi were all promoted from the post of chief-of-staff rather than the post of vice commander. They were all army-level officers (*junji*) four years ago. Wang Xibin and Tong Shiping, the new commandant and commissar of National Defense University, were recently promoted from the posts of chief-of-staff of a military region and assistant director of the General Political Department, respectively. The increasing incidence of “two-step” promotions most likely can be read as a sign of growing favoritism within the PLA linked to political factions led by Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao.

Equally significant, 11 of the 65 military leaders on the 17th CC have the military ranking of major general or lower. The lowest ranking, Air Force Col. Yang Liwei, was China’s first astronaut and it is likely that his membership on the 17th CC will not cause much controversy among the military establishment. Nanjing MR Chief-of-Staff Cai Yinting, Chengdu MR Chief-of-Staff Ai Husheng, Guangzhou MR Chief-of-Staff Xu Fenlin and Lanzhou MR Chief-of-Staff Liu Yuejun are all major generals in rank and all are in their mid-50s. The fact that a significant number of PLA representatives on the 17th CC

Current Rank of Military Leaders in 17th CC

Mil. Rank	No.	%
Gen./Adm.	21	32
Lt. Gen./Vice Adm.	33	51
Major Gen./Rear Adm.	10	15
Colonel	1	2
Total	65	100

hold lower military ranks may reflect political favoritism in expediting their career advancement, and this is likely to cause some resentment from the higher-ranked officers.

The large-scale turnover of military leaders and the rise of relatively young officers may help consolidate Hu Jintao's power and authority within the military. It might be too simplistic to assume that these military appointees will owe their loyalty to the current CMC chairman, since most of them advanced their careers through ordinary step-by-step promotions, but it is highly likely that a good number of those receiving "two-step" promotions will exhibit some degree of personal loyalty to Hu Jintao. Some may have strong residual allegiances or patron-client ties to Jiang Zemin. For example, Xu Qiliang worked with Jiang in Shanghai in the 1980s and has been often seen as Jiang's protégé. Nevertheless, in the years since he took the helm of the military, Hu has been able to move a large number of newer, younger military officers onto the CMC and CC. This is not to say that military leaders promoted for factional reasons are ipso facto less competent than their non-politically-aligned peers. Both factional links and meritocratic factors are present in Chinese military elite formation.

Characteristics of China's Military Elite

Not surprisingly, the PLA is an overwhelmingly Han-dominated, male-run organization, much like the CCP itself. Among the 65 military elites on the 17th CC, there is only one non-Han ethnic minority, Deputy Director of the General Political Department Liu Zhenqi, who is a Hui Muslim. All but one, Chen Zuoming, a leading expert on China's military computer software center, are male.

In terms of their places of birth, 12 of the 65 members of the military elite (18 percent) hail from Shandong province in Eastern China. The prominence of Shandong-born military elites becomes more obvious when one looks at the CMC, where Director of the General Political Department Li Jinai; Cmdr. of the Second Artillery Corps Jing Zhiyuan; and Xu Qiliang are all natives of Shandong. The dominance of Shandong officers among the military elite is not a

new phenomenon. Among the 67 military members of the 16th CC, 14 (21 percent) were born in Shandong and even more astonishingly, 28 percent of the 46 military members of the 14th CC in 1992 were Shandong natives.¹¹

Some observers believe that the overrepresentation of Shandong natives in the military leadership since the 1990s is a result of the fact that two vice chairs of the CMC in the 1990s, Zhang Wannian and Chi Haotian, hailed from Shandong.¹² However, the actual reasons for this phenomenon are almost certainly more complicated, and probably have more to do with historical and cultural factors than native place favoritism by top leaders.¹³ According to a recent Chinese report, an astonishing total of 66 military officials at the rank of major general and above have their roots in Shandong's Wendeng County alone.¹⁴ These include Commissar of the General Armament Department Chi Wanchun and Deputy Director of the General Political Department Sun Zhongtong.

Turning to the question of the age structure of the leadership of the PLA, roughly four-fifths of the military elites on the 17th CC fall between the ages of 55 and 64 years of age, with the largest group being officials in their late 50's. This is in line with the overall effort of the Chinese political elite to create more opportunities for younger officials to move into positions of responsibility. The youngest member of the Chinese military elite is Yang Liwei, who was born in 1965.

Age Distribiton of
Mil. Leaders in the 17th CC

Age (Birth Year)	No.	%
65-67 (born 1940-1942)	5	8
60-64 (born 1943-1947)	24	37
55-59 (born 1948-52)	27	41
50-54 (born 1953-1957)	6	9
45-49 (born 1958-1962)	0	0
40-44 (born 1963-1967)	1	2
Unknown	2	3
Total	65	100

An alternate axis along which one can analyze the Chinese military elite is by looking at when these top leaders joined the PLA. There has been a clear transformation of the age structure and socialization experiences of the Chinese military elite between 1992 and 2007 (see Appendix 2). This progression moved from those officers who joined during the early years of the Communist insurgency and the anti-Japanese

resistance (represented by those serving in the 14th CC), through those whose initial experiences in the PLA came during the era of socialist construction and transformation of the Chinese countryside (1955-1965) and who dominated the 15th and 16th CCs, to the present crop of military leaders, the majority of whom joined the PLA during the decade of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).

Lack of war experience is certainly one of the most salient collective traits of the current generation of the PLA elite. Among the officers at MR level or above, very few have combat experience and the number with combat experience decreased as a result of the 17th Party Congress. In 2004, approximately 96 percent of the highest-ranking PLA officers did not have any war experience.¹⁵ By contrast, the percentage of top military leaders who lacked combat experience in 1988 was a mere 21 percent.¹⁶ Among the 65 military members of the 17th CC, only Liang Guanglie and Liao Xilong have had any substantial combat experience (both participated in China's short war with Vietnam in 1979).

While Chinese military elites have, on average, been growing younger as a cohort, they have also been transitioning as a group in terms of the service branch they hail from. During the Mao-era, when China's focus was on a defensive posture that leveraged China's large territory and massive ground forces to absorb an enemy's first strike, the PLA leadership came mostly from the army. Today, as

A lack of war experiences is a salient trait of the current PLA elite.

China moves towards a more outward-looking posture focused on projecting power offshore, the military elite increasingly reflects this change in focus as an increasing percentage within the CC come from the air and naval forces. The combined percentage of air and naval officers among the top military elite has nearly doubled from 14 percent in 1992 to 25 percent in 2007. The total number of Air Force representatives has increased by 200 percent during this 15-year period, while those of the Navy have risen by 133 percent. Conversely, representation by ground forces in the CC has steadily declined from 83 percent in 1992 to 69 percent in 2007. It is worth noting, however, that China's ground forces remain the most prominently represented service branch, even if their share of overall CC representation is shrinking.

PLA Reps on Recent CC by Service Branch

Service Branch	14th CC Officers (1992)		15th CC Officers (1997)		16th CC Officers (2002)		17th CC Officers (2007)	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Ground Forces ¹⁷	38	82	53	80	53	79	45	69
Air Force	3	7	5	8	6	9	9	14
Navy	3	7	5	8	4	6	7	11
Armed Police	2	4	3	4	4	6	4	6
Total	46	100	66	100	67	100	65	100

Somewhat surprisingly, given the rising number of “mass incidents” (*quntixing shijian*) in China in recent years, the number of representatives on the CC from the People’s Armed Police has stayed constant over the past five years. Perhaps reflecting Beijing’s concern over maintaining territorial integrity, both the chief officer of the Tibet Military District and the chief officer of the Xinjiang Military District serve as full members of the CC.

It is probably not by chance that the number and balance of service branch representatives changed greatly between the 14th and 15th CCs, whereas there was no dramatic change between the 15th and 16th CCs. In the early 1990s, Jiang Zemin, then-chairman of the CMC, was populating the leadership of the Chinese military with officers who would owe their loyalty primarily to his sponsorship, while easing aside those officers who had links to other factions. Since forcing rival elites out is harder and more politically costly than simply adding representatives of one’s own, as Jiang Zemin moved to consolidate his power, he simply expanded the number of military representatives on the CC, a strategy known as “mixing in sand” (*chan shazi*). As a result, between 1992 and 1997, the number of officers on the CC went up by nearly 50 percent from 46 to 66, while the CC as a whole expanded only marginally. By 1997, Jiang’s position within the Chinese political and military establishments was largely unassailable, and he therefore had little incentive to undertake any substantial reshuffling of military elites when the 16th Party Congress met in 2002.

Following a similar logic, when Hu Jintao took over the CMC in 2004, he needed to put some of his own followers in positions of authority in order to consolidate his power base within the PLA. Because Jiang Zemin had already dramatically expanded the number of military representatives on the CC in the mid-1990s, Hu could not simply add more military representatives to the CC and populate the additional seats with his own men. As a result, the only option available to President Hu was to push through a remaking of the composition of the CC, which he could do in part by promoting officers with experience in the air and naval forces that constitute the focus of China's military modernization efforts and which would also be crucial in any Taiwan Strait eventuality. Thus, the number of PLA seats on the CC remained almost statistically constant, while the actual representatives filling the military seats at the 17th CC turned over by a dramatic 66 percent.

The growing professional bifurcation between military and political officers is another important trend in China's military leadership.¹⁸ Officers whose area of focus is military operations (such as commanders and chiefs-of-staff) and officers who work in political affairs (such as political commissars and directors of political departments) have usually advanced their careers by developing specializations, and not by working across the military operations/political affairs divide. Interestingly, despite this shift of the military elite towards greater balance among service branches, the overall functional specializations, broken down along military, political and technical axes, has remained strikingly stable.

Distribution of Elites within PLA Leadership by Expertise

Field	14th CC Officers		15th CC Officers		16th CC Officers		17th CC Officers	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Military	24	52	38	58	41	61	36	55
Political	18	39	24	36	22	33	24	37
Technical/ Academic	4	9	4	6	4	6	5	8
Total	46	100	66	100	67	100	65	100

This suggests that over the past 15 years, Party and military elites have struck what they deem to be a useful balance between military elites whose area of expertise is focused on war-fighting, those whose emphasis is on political control, and those few who specialize in academic or technical fields.

For example, Xu Caihou and Li Jinai, two prominent members of the CMC, have advanced their careers largely in the area of political affairs; interestingly, both also graduated from the Harbin Institute of Military Engineering (HIME). Their technical training in military engineering also gave them educational credentials with which they were able to advance their political careers within the military establishment. Several other military CC members also graduated from the HIME (see Appendix 3). The rise of the HIME school network is partially the result of the emphasis on technical expertise within the PLA. Twenty-one percent of military CC members received post-graduate degrees, some in full-time regular programs and others in part-time programs. Almost all these top military

The rise of young, educated military technocrats may profoundly change PLA officer corps at all levels of leadership.

officers attended the National Defense University for mid-career training, most often in the areas of military operations and/or technical fields. Chen Bingde, Guangzhou MR Cmdr. Zhang Qinsheng and Fang Fenghui are all known for their strong interest and expertise in electronic warfare and joint military operations.¹⁹ 50-year old Chen Zuoming is the chief engineer of China's military computer system. These leaders' ascent to posts in the top of China's military leadership reflects China's drive for military modernization and technocratic expertise.

According to the official *PLA Daily*, at present about 10 percent of officers at the army level in the PLA have received foreign training and 47 percent have undergone high-tech knowledge training at home.²⁰ A number of officers with engineering degrees or doctoral degrees in computer science now serve as vice commanders or chiefs-of-staff in the group armies.²¹ Technical experts and researchers who work at the military academies are now granted a 3-6 month sabbatical after every five-year period of work.²² It should be noted that young technocrats now dominate

the leadership of China's military industries, especially in space programs. Most of these individuals are not in military service. They include 46-year old Zhang Qingwei (minister of Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense), 45-year old Yuan Jiajun (president of the China Space Research Institute), 44-year old Wu Yansheng (president of China Research Institute of Launching Technology), and 48-year old Ma Xinrui (president of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp.).²³ Zhang and Yuan both serve on the 17th CC as civilians. According to the Chinese official media, the average age of China's scientists involved in missile launching technology in 2003 was 18 years younger than that those working in this field in 1992.²⁴

The rise of young, well-educated military technocrats, which is probably still in its initial stages, may profoundly change the PLA officer corps at all levels of leadership in the years to come. An editorial in the *PLA Daily* in 2003 claimed that the PLA plans to make the transition from an army with mechanical and semi-mechanical equipment to an army with digital capabilities. In order to fulfill this mission, the PLA will need to emphasize education and the formation of strong cohorts of commanders, staff, scientists, technical specialists and junior officers.²⁵ In the medium-term future, young military technocrats whose socialization took place from the mid-1980s through the late 1990s, a time when China's economic take-off began, may be more nationalistic and more assertive than their predecessors who were socialized at a time when China was weaker on the international stage.

Meritocracy vs. Political Networks

According to Party and military guidelines, promotions within the PLA should result from a combination of previous demonstrated competence and a match between skills sets and job openings. In practice, however, China's top military leaders are often advanced in part as a result of their perceived political affiliations, policy positions and other factors. In addition to native place and school ties, other forms of favoritism and nepotism, for example, family ties and patron-client relations (including previous work as *mishu*) and the Group Army

affiliations, have played an important role in the promotion of the new generation of officers.

As in the realm of civilian leadership, where a number of prominent children of former high-ranking officials currently hold important posts, in the military too these “princelings” (*taizi*) are increasingly assuming positions of authority.²⁶ As revolutionary credentials have declined in prominence, other factors, such as political networks, school ties and technical expertise have become increasingly important in elite formation. Among the PLA elite, three princelings have made it onto the CMC, including Li Jinai, Wu Shengli and Xu Qiliang. Among the 65 military CC members, at least 12 can be identified as princelings. Just as in the new Politburo, where the rise of figures such as Xi Jinping, Zhou Yongkang, Bo Xilai and Wang Qishan (all princelings) caused a good deal of consternation amongst Party officials not similarly blessed with comparably prominent offspring, the rise of a cohort of princeling military elites poses the potential to fragment China’s fighting forces along the fault line of nepotism and privilege.²⁷

Chinese analysts and the general public have been quite critical about the prevalence of princelings in the military leadership whose “helicopter-like rises” owe more to nepotism than to professional competence.²⁸ Additionally, if factional struggles break out into the open again in the future, it is possible that, owing to their common identity as children of privilege and the shared political interests that stem from this, China’s military princelings may side with the CCP’s civilian princelings. If so, the prevalence of princelings in the military may prove crucial to the outcome of such intra-elite contention.

Another similarity between China’s civilian and military elites is the prominence of a *mishu* path to power. *Mishu*, or officials who have served as personal assistants, office directors or chiefs-of-staff to top leaders, enjoy advantages in terms of career prospects. Their experience working in close proximity to top leaders gives them opportunities to see how power and authority function up close, allows them to build political ties, and gives them greater chances for career advancement. At least eight of the top 65 most prominent members of the current CC military elite have backgrounds as former *mishu* (see Appendix 4). They include Jiang

Military Leaders with Princeling Backgrounds

Name	Born	Current Post	Princeling Background
Li Jimai	1942	Director, Gen. Political Depart; CMC member	Newpewh of Li Jing (former deputy chief of the General Staff)
Wu Shengli	1945	Commander, Navy; CMC member	Son of a former vice governor of Zhejiang Province
Xu Qiliang	1950	Commander, Air Force; CMC member	Son of Xu Letian (former deputy commander of Air Force)
Peng Xiaofeng	1945	Commissar, Second Artillery Corps	Son of Peng Xuefeng (revolutionary veteran)
Liu Yuan	1951	Commissar, Academy of Mil. Sciences	Son of Liu Shaoqi (former President of P.R.C.)
Zhang Youxia	1950	Commander, Shenyang MR	Son of Zhang Zongxun (former director, General Logistic Dept.)
Zhang Haiyang	1949	Commissar, Chengdu MR	Son of Zhang Zhen (former vice chair, CMC)
Ma Xiaotian	1949	Deputy Chief-of-Staff, General Staff	Son of Ma Zaiyac (former dean of PLA Political Academy)
Liu Xiaojiang	1949	Deputy Commissar of Navy	Son-in-law of Hu Yaobang (former general-secretary of CCP)
Liu Yuejun	1954	Chief-of-Staff, Lanzhou MR	Son of Liu Zhimin (former commissar of Logistics Dept. of Guangzhou MR)
Ding Yiping	1951	Chief-of-Staff, Navy	Son of Ding Qiusheng (former commissar of North Seas Fleet)
Ai Husheng	1951	Chief-of-Staff, Chengdu MR	Son of Ai Fulin (former vice commander, Artillery Corps of Shenyang MR)

Zemin's *mishu* Jia Ting'an (director of the General Office of the CMC), former Vice Chairman of the CMC Zhang Wannian's *mishu* Cai Yingting (Nanjing MR Chief-of-Staff) and former Minister of Defense Ye Jianying's body guard Cao Qing (director of the Central Body Guard Bureau). At present, it is not possible to determine whether or not these *mishu cum* military leaders are professionally competent. The fact that Jia Ting'an received the lowest number of votes among the alternates on the 17th CC suggests that a large number of his political peers were resistant to his appointment.

A number of top ranking military officials have risen together, in part likely owing to the sponsorship of prominent members of the military whom they have worked for in the past. In the history of the PLA, field army associations have been among the most important political networks in the military. In his path-breaking study of political factions of China's military elite, William Whitson observed that the Field Army background was the most important determinant of the rise and fall of military officers of the PLA.²⁹ An overwhelming majority of top officers from 1966 to 1971 were from Lin Biao's Fourth Field Army faction. But after Lin fell, most of the high-ranking officers with Fourth Field Army backgrounds were purged.³⁰ When Deng Xiaoping returned to power after the death of Mao, he promoted many of his own Second Field Army associates to important military positions. Of the 17 full generals that he commissioned in 1988, 10 (59 percent) were from the Second Field Army, and many came from Deng's own unit, the 129th Division.³¹ Of the six military members on the CMC in the late 1980s, half were from the Second Field Army.

The Field Army identities, however, became blurred in the early 1990s because of the frequency of both the shuffling of post assignments among officers and the reorganization of the ground forces. In 1990, the PLA established the group armies system, which now constitutes the most important component in the ground force. As a result, group army affiliations have become essential in the selection of high-ranking officers in the ground force.³² Top military leaders such as Guo Boxiong, Xu Caihou, Liang Guanglie, Chen Bingde and Liao Xilong, for example, all have experience serving as chief officers in group armies. Many

commanders and political commissars in China's seven military regions were selected from the group armies. Their political associations and the networking opportunities that they had in the group armies could explain their quick rise to the top of China's military leadership. For example, a significant contingent of officers who worked with Guo Boxiong in the 47th Group Army in the Lanzhou Military Region, including Chang Wanquan, Liu Dongdong, Fang Fenghui, Xu Fenlin and Director of the Political Department of the Nanjing MR Yiming, have risen to positions of prominence on the new 17th CC.³³

PLA: Hu is in Charge?

The broad demographic and professional characteristics of China's military elites are changing rapidly. The representatives of the Chinese armed forces on the 17th Party CC are better-educated, more specialized and more technologically-adept than any preceding group of military elites in Chinese history. This article shows that the PLA elites of today are more balanced among the ground, air and naval forces than ever before, a development that probably signals China's intention to develop a military capable of projecting power away from China's shores rather than simply overwhelming an adversary with the country's tremendous size and manpower. China's military modernization efforts, much of which focus on enhancing the country's air and naval power, appear to be in the process of being translated into greater representation for these service branches in the Party's CMC and CC.

To interpret the large-scale turnover in military officers at the 17th Party Congress conclusively as a victory for Hu Jintao in his bid to establish his preeminence within the armed forces might be a bit premature, as we are still learning a great deal about the factional links and personal outlooks of a number of top members of the Chinese military elite. Nonetheless, it is probably fair to say that a large number of the newly-minted military members of the CMC and CC owe their positions to CMC Chairman Hu, and more data on these individuals' relationships with the top leader will come out in time. At present, what can be argued with some degree of confidence is that a number of the broad trends that

one sees sweeping through the civilian politics of the People's Republic of China are also manifest in its military politics as well. These include the rise of (and rising resentment against) a cohort of princelings and officials with *mishu* backgrounds, and an increasing trend towards younger, more professional officers.

Thus, an initial answer to the question of what an analysis of the demographic and career trends of the PLA elite tells us about where China's military is heading would appear to be that such an analysis reveals that the Chinese armed forces are experiencing the same broad trends Chinese society as a whole and the CCP in particular. Looking at the elite representatives of the Chinese military, one can see that the decline in charismatic, revolutionary legitimacy and "redness" has been paralleled by rising emphasis on functional specialization and "expertise."

These trends reflect a rebalancing in the distribution of positions of power across the military service branches. These developments appear to be very much in line with China's vision of the future of warfare. Whether this

A large number of newly-minted military members of the CC and CMC owe thier positions to Hu.

will carry any great import for future war-planning/war-fighting, or whether it hints at the importance of planning for eventualities in the Taiwan Strait (as some analysts have suggested), it is probably impossible to say with any degree of certainty at present, but the trends certainly appear to be suggestive of where China sees military affairs headed.³⁴

It is difficult to convincingly distinguish between the promotion of officers whose functional areas of expertise would be useful for a military that seeks to be more competent in the projection of power away from the Chinese mainland, and those officers who have spent their careers engaged in war-gaming for a conflict in the Taiwan Strait that would likely rely heavily on air and naval power. At any rate, whether they were promoted for their expertise in military modernization, their understanding of how best to use force against Taiwan, or for other reasons such as factionalism or seniority, the elevation of air and naval officers is at any rate likely to result in increased advocacy for the interests of these service branches. At the same time, increasing cooperation among the top representatives of these

services could improve China's ability to handle integrated air-sea military operations, a necessity if China ever gets into a war with Taiwan.

Professionalism and favoritism, formal procedures and informal networks, and new concepts of modern warfare as well as traditional methods of military operations all appear to coexist. The PLA's drive towards military technocracy and defense modernization has to overcome a number of technical, logistical and political obstacles. A recognition of the complexities and contradictions in the assessment of China's military leadership, however, should not prevent us from grasping its overall technocratic trend. The characteristics of the new generation of PLA leaders – their biographical traits, professional competence, political associations and military doctrines – will affect China's choices for the future and have significant ramifications far beyond its borders. ☞

Appendix I: China's Top Military Officers (2007)³⁵

Name	Born	Position	Since	Previous Position	Military Rank	Year	17 th CC Member
Guo Boxiong	1942	Vice Chair, CMC	2002	Executive Deputy Chief of General Staff	General	1999	CC Mem, PB Mem.
Xu Caihou	1943	Vice Chair, CMC	2002	Director, General Political Dept.	General	1999	CC Mem, PB Mem.*
Liang Guanglie	1940	Member, CMC (Defense Minister?)	2002	Chief-of-Staff of the General Staff	General	2002	CC Mem, CMC Mem.
Chen Bingde	1941	Chief of the General Staff	2007	Director, General Armament Dept.	General	2002	CC Mem, CMC Mem.*
Li Jinai	1942	Director, General Political Dept.	2004	Director, General Armament Dept.	General	2000	CC Mem, CMC Mem.
Liao Xilong	1940	Director, General Logistics Dept	2002	Commander, Chengdu MR	General	2000	CC Mem, CMC Mem.
Chang Wanquan	1949	Director, General Armament Dept.	2007	Commander, Shenyang MR	General	2007	CC Mem, CMC Mem.*
Jing Zhiyuan	1944	Commander, 2nd Artillery Corps	2003	Chief-of-Staff, 2nd Artillery Corps	General	2004	CC Mem, CMC Mem.
Wu Shengli	1945	Commander, Navy	2006	Deputy Chief-of-Staff of General Staff	Admiral	2007	CC Mem*CMC Mem.*
Xu Qiliang	1950	Commander, Air Force	2007	Deputy Chief-of-Staff of General Staff	General	2007	CC Mem, CMC Mem.*
Sun Dafa	1945	Commissar, General Logistics Dept.	2005	Deputy Commissar, Nanjing MR	General	2007	CC Mem.*
Chi Wanchun	1946	Commissar, Gen. Armament Dept.	2002	Commissar, Defense S & T Univ.	General	2006	CC Mem.
Hu Yanlin	1943	Commissar, Navy	2003	Deputy Commissar, Navy	Admiral	2004	None
Deng Changyou	1947	Commissar, Air Force	2002	Director, Political Dept. Air Force	General	2006	CC Mem.
Peng Xiaofeng	1942	Commissar, 2nd Artillery	2003	Deputy Commissar, NDU	General	2006	CC Mem.*
Wu Shuangzhan	1945	Commander, Armed Police Force	1999	Deputy Commander, Armed Police Force	General	2004	CC Mem.
Yu Linxiang	1945	Commissar, Armed Police Force	2007	Commissar, Lanzhou MR	General	2006	CC Mem.*
Liu Chengjun	1949	Commandant, Acad. of Mil. Sciences	2007	Deputy Commander, Air Force	Lt. General	2004	CC Mem.*

Appendix I (cont.)

Name	Born	Position	Since	Previous Position	Military Rank	Year	17th CC Member
Liu Yuan	1951	Commissar, Acad. of Mil. Sciences	2005	Deputy Commissar, Gen. Logistics Dept.	Lt. General	2000	CC Mem.*
Wang Xilin	1948	Commandant, NDU	2007	Chief-of-Staff, Beijing MR	Lt. General	2007	CC Mem.*
Tong Shipping	1948?	Commissar, NDU	2007	Assistant Director, Gen. Political Dept.	Lt. General	2004	CC Mem.*
Wen Xisen	1945	Commandant, Defense S & T Univ.	1999	Commandant, NDU	Lt. General	2000	None
Xu Yitian	?	Commissar, Defense S & T Univ.	2005	Deputy Commissar, Guangzhou MR	Lt. General	2006	CC Alternate*
Zhang Youxia	1950	Commander, Shenyang MR	2007	Vice Commander, Beijing MR	Lt. General	2007	CC Mem.*
Huang Xianzhong	1947	Commissar, Shenyang MR	2005	Commissar, Defense S & T Univ.	Lt. General	2004	CC Mem.*
Fang Fenghui	1951	Commander, Beijing MR	2007	Chief-of-staff, Guangzhou MR	Lt. General	2005	CC Mem.*
Fu Tinggui	1944	Commissar, Beijing MR	2003	Director, Political Dept. Beijing MR	General	2006	CC Mem.
Wang Guosheng	1947	Commander, Lanzhou MR	2007	Chief-of-staff, Lanzhou MR	Lt. General	2005	CC Mem.*
Li Changcai	1950?	Commissar, Lanzhou MR	2007	Deputy Commissar, Nanjing MR	Lt. General	2006	CC Mem.*
Fan Changlong	1947	Commander, Jinan MR	2004	Assistant Chief-of-Staff of General Staff	Lt. General	2002	CC Mem.*
Liu Dongdong	1945	Commissar, Jinan MR	2002	Commissar, Lanzhou MR	General	2004	CC Mem.
Zhao Keshi	1947	Commander, Nanjing MR	2007	Chief-of-Staff, Nanjing MR	Lt. General	2005	CC Mem.*
Chen Guoling	1950?	Commissar, Nanjing MR	2007	Deputy Commissar, Guangzhou MR	Lt. General	2006	CC Mem.*
Zhang Qinsheng	1948	Commander, Guangzhou MR	2007	Deputy Chief of General Staff	Lt. General	2006	CC Mem.*
Zhang Yang	1951	Commissar, Guangzhou MR	2007	Director, Political Dept., Guangzhou MR	Lt. General	2007	CC Mem.*
Li Shiming	1948	Commander, Chengdu MR	2007	Vice Commander, Chengdu MR	Lt. General	2005	CC Mem.*
Zhang Haiyang	1949	Commissar, Chengdu MR	2005	Deputy Commissar, Beijing MR	Lt. General	2003	CC Mem.*

Appendix 2: Yr. of Joining the PLA for Senior Officers³⁶

Year Joining the PLA	14th CC Officers (1992)		15th CC Officers (1997)		16th CC Officers (2002)		17th CC Officers (2007)	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
1929-1937	3	7	-	-	-	-	-	-
1938-1944	7	15	3	4	-	-	-	-
1945-1949	21	46	4	6	-	-	-	-
1950-1954	4	9	13	20	3	4	-	-
1955-1965	1	2	44	67	42	63	22	34
1966-1976	-	-	2	3	8	12	33	51
1977-1992	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	3
Unknown	10	22	-	-	14	21	8	12
Total	46	100	66	100	67	100	65	100

Appendix 3: Senior Officers Who Studied at the Harbin Institute of Military Engineering (HIME)

Name	Born	Military Rank	Current Position	Years at HIME	Major
Xu Caihou	1943	General	Vice Chairman, CMC	1963-1968	Electrical Engineering
Li Jinai	1942	General	Director, General Political Dept.	1961-1966	Physics
Chi Wanchun	1946	Lt. General	Commissar, General Armament Dept.	1965-1970	Air Force Engineering
Peng Xiaofeng	1945	Lt. General	Commissar, 2 nd Artillery	1963-1968	Missile Engineering
Huang Xianzhong	1947	Lt. General	Commissar, Shenyang MR	1964-1969	Missile Engineering
Li Andong	1947	Lt. General	Deputy Director, General Armament Dept.	1965-1970	Air Force Engineering
Ding Yiping	1951	Vice Adm.	Deputy Chief-of-Staff, Navy	Unknown	Mid-career training

Appendix 4: Senior Military Leaders with Mishu Experience

Name	Position	Previously Served as a Mishu or Office Director for:
Li Jinai	Director, General Political Dept.	Yu Qiuli (former Director, General Political Dept.)
Chang Wanquan	Director, General Armament Dept.	Han Xianchu (former Commander, Lanzhou MR)
Sun Dafa	Commissar, General Logistics Dept.	Li Desheng (former Director, General Political Dept.)
Yu Linxiang	Commissar, Armed Police Force	Name Unknown (former Dir., Political Dept., Nanjing MR)
Fu Tinggui	Commissar, Beijing MR	Name Unknown, (former Commander, Jilin Military District)
Jia Ting'an	Director, CMC General Office	Jiang Zemin (former Chairman, CMC)
Cao Qing	Director, Central Body Guard Bureau	Ye Jianying (former Minister of Defense)
Cai Yingting	Chief-of-Staff, Nanjing MR	Zhang Wannian (former Vice Chairman, CMC)

Notes

* The authors would like to thank Yinsheng Li for his research assistance on this article

¹ See, for e.g., Cody, Edward, "China Parades Next Generation of Leaders," *The Washington Post*, Oct. 22, 2007, p. A10; Kahn, Joseph, "Politburo in China Gets 4 New Members," *The New York Times*, Oct. 22, 2007; and Lam, Willy, "Hu's Impasse at the 17th Party Congress," *China Brief*, Vol. 7, No. 19 (Oct. 17, 2007), pp. 6-7.

² Li, C. and L. White, "The Sixteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Hu Gets What?" *Asian Survey*, Vol. 43, No. 4 (July/August 2002): 560.

³ For a more detailed study of the military leaders on the 16th CC, see Cheng Li, "The New Military Elite: Generational Profile and Contradictory Trends," in David M. Finkelstein and Kristen Gunness (eds.), *Swimming in a New Sea: Civil-Military Issues in Today's China* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2007), pp. 48-73.

⁴ Only Beijing MR Commissar Fu Tinggui and Jinan MR Commissar Liu Dongdong were members of the previous 16th CC.

⁵ Wu Shuangzhan, commander of Armed Police Force, has the longest tenure, having served in his current position since 1999.

⁶ Examples include former Commissar of the Second Artillery Sui Mingtai, former Commissar of the General Logistics Department Zhang Wentai, former Commander of the Beijing MR Zhu Qi and former Commissar of the Nanjing MR Lei Mingqiu, all of whom were born in 1942.

⁷ Quoted from the section on China in *Shijie junshi nianjian* (*The World Military Yearbook*, 2001). Nov. 18, 2002, see <http://www.qianlong.com>.

⁸ Ibid. See also <http://chinesenewsnet.com>. Aug. 16, 2003.

⁹ Quoted from *Wenhui Daily* (Hong Kong), Aug. 15, 2003, and also see <http://www.sina.com.cn>. Aug. 15, 2003.

¹⁰ Excerpted from *Shijie junshi nianjian 2001* (*World Military Yearbook*, 2001), Nov. 18, 2002, see <http://www.qianlong.com>.

¹¹ Li, C. and L. White, "The Army in the Succession to Deng Xiaoping: Familiar Fealties and Technocratic Trends," *Asian Survey* Vol. 33, No. 8 (August 1993), p. 767.

¹² Ling Haijian. *Zhonggong jundui xinjiangxing* (*The profile of prominent military chiefs in China*). Hong Kong: Taipingyang shiji chubanshe, 1999, p. 367.

¹³ Traditionally, careers in the military have been quite popular among Shandong natives. In China's recent history, many Shandongnese joined the Communist-led New Fourth Army (*xinsijun*) during the Anti-Japanese War, and many of these soldiers later became high-ranking PLA officers after the Communist revolution.

¹⁴ See <http://www.chinesenewsnet.com>. Sept. 6, 2006.

¹⁵ Cheng Li, "The New Military Elite: Generational Profile and Contradictory Trends," in David M. Finkelstein and Kristen Gunness (eds.), *Civil-Military Relations in Today's China: Swimming in a New Sea* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2007), p. 60.

¹⁶ Li, C. and L. White, "The Army in the Succession to Deng Xiaoping: Familiar Fealties and Technocratic Trends," *Asian Survey* Vol. 33, No. 8 (August 1993), p. 773.

¹⁷ Officers in the Second Artillery Corps are included in the Ground Force.

¹⁸ For the notion of "bifurcation" between civilian and PLA elites, between military and political officers, see Shambaugh, David, "China's New High Command," in Michael Marti, ed., *The PLA and Chinese Society in Transition* (Washington DC: National Defense University

Press, 2003).

¹⁹ *Lianhe Zaobao* (*United Morning News*), Sept. 13, 2007.

²⁰ Quoted from *Lianhe Zaobao*, Sept. 11, 2007.

²¹ *Jiefangjun bao* (*PLA Daily*), Oct. 11, 2007.

²² See <http://www.chinesenewsnet.com>. Aug. 5, 2007.

²³ For more discussion of the young technocrats in China's defense and space industries, see *Wenhui bao* (Hong Kong), Sept. 24, 2007.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Jiefangjun bao*, Aug. 1, 2003, p. 1.

²⁶ For the large number of princelings in the civilian leadership at present-day China, see Cheng Li, "China's Most Powerful 'Princelings': How Many Will Enter the New Politburo?" *Jamestown Foundation China Brief*, Volume 7, Issue 19 (October 2007), pp. 2-5.

²⁷ See *ibid.*

²⁸ For example, some Chinese analysts observed that senior officers with princeling backgrounds in the Second Artillery, such as Commissar Peng Xiaofeng, were hardly qualified to serve in the positions they were promoted to, see <http://www.chinesenewsnet.com>. Sept. 16, 2006.

²⁹ Whitson, William, "The Field Army in Chinese Communist Military Politics," *China Quarterly*, no. 37 (January/March 1969).

³⁰ Parish, William "Factions in Chinese Military Politics," *China Quarterly*, no. 56 (October/December 1973), pp. 667-99; and Li, C. and L. White, "The Army in the Succession to Deng Xiaoping: Familiar Fealties and Technocratic Trends," *Asian Survey* Vol. 33, No. 8 (August 1993), pp. 771-772. On the evolutionary change of the Field Army systems, also see Cheng Tzu-ming, "Evolution of the People's Liberation Army," *Issues and Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 12 (December 1979). For more recent and comprehensive analysis of the Field Army associations, see the website with a special focus on the history of the Field Army, <http://qing.wmshow.net>. Sept. 3, 2003.

³¹ Li, C. and L. White, "The Army in the Succession to Deng Xiaoping: Familiar Fealties and Technocratic Trends," *Asian Survey* Vol. 33, No. 8 (August 1993), p. 772.

³² The "field army" (*yezhan jun*) system was an organizational structure that emerged within the Red Army during the period of the civil war. Later, after the founding of the People's Republic, the PLA was restructured along geographic lines. Later, the PLA ground forces were reorganized again into "group armies" (*jituan jun*) and "provincial military districts" under the Greater Military Region (*da junqu*) system.

³³ Similarly, the large contingent of officers who advanced their careers through work in the Nanjing MR may also be a result of political networking. Eleven military leaders in the 17th CC come from the Nanjing MR. These include Liang Guanglie, Chen Bingde, Xu Qiliang, Wu Shengli, Zhao Keshi, Deputy Chief of the General Staff Ma Xiaotian, Deputy Director of the General Political Department Liu Yongzhi, Nanjing MR Commissar Chen Guoling, Commandant of the Academy of Military Science Liu Chengjun, and Lanzhou MR Commissar Li Changcai. Additionally, Jing Zhiyuan served for a long time in the No. 52 Artillery Base in Huangshan, Anhui, which belongs to the Nanjing MR.

³⁴ Campbell, Kurt, "US Stalling May Have Ramifications," *The Taipei Times*, Oct. 19, 2007, <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2007/10/19/2003383827>, 11-14-2007.

³⁵ Note: * = newly elected at the 17th Party Congress.

³⁶ The data on officers on the 14th CC is derived from Cheng, L. and L. White, "The Army in

the Succession to Deng Xiaoping: Familiar Fealties and Technocratic Trends,” *Asian Survey* Vol. 33, No. 8 (August 1993), p. 765. Data on officers on the 16th CC derived from Cheng Li’s database on all 356 members of the 16th CC. See also Cheng, L. and L. White, “The Sixteenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party: Hu Gets What?” *Asian Survey* Vol. 43, No. 4 (July/August 2003), pp. 553-597.